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resolve. The authors leave us with the
(lukewarm) lesson that airpower, properly employed, is a necessary, albeit insufficient, tool of defense and foreign
policy.
The Kosovo war provides today’s students of international affairs a textbook
case in the traditional art of statecraft in
the world of realpolitik. Many old lessons
are emphasized: strategy must be driven
by policy, coercive diplomacy works only
when one possesses military might and
resolve, armed forces must be given
proper strategic direction, and alliance
solidarity is crucial.
However, Winning Ugly adds new lessons
as well, because Kosovo was Nato’s principal test to date in conducting military
operations outside its borders against a
sovereign nation for essentially humanitarian purposes. Nato’s performance in
Kosovo may have helped define the practicality and desirability of this role in the
twenty-first-century world. This book
enhances our understanding of what may
become the future of Nato as well as
some part of the future of war.
TOM FEDYSZYN
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House, Jonathan M. Combined Arms Warfare in the
Twentieth Century. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
2001. 364pp. $45

A retired Army officer formerly on the
faculty of the Command and General
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Jonathan House has written an updated edition of a text he authored in the
1980s to support the education of Army
officers. His express intentions are to
strip the jargon in order to make the
subject intelligible to a more general
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readership, and to update the book with
an analysis of combined-arms progress
in the 1990s. The result is a readable and
lucid analysis of combined-arms warfare
in the twentieth century, a work that a
layman can follow without keeping a dictionary of military terms handy.
For those with a genuine interest in military affairs, this book is ultimately rewarding. However, it is more about
organizational dynamics than about battles and tactics, and that may prove tedious to the casual reader. House
methodically traces the development of
combined-arms practice in the major armies of the world, offering just enough
description of battles and campaigns to
illustrate the effects of the various technical and organizational developments over
the years.
House tends to focus his analysis through
the lens of organizational design (an inclination shared by this reviewer) and
comes up with some interesting results
that do not always conform to conventional wisdom. For instance, he makes
the case that the French and British defeat in the 1940 Battle of France can be
adequately explained by their centralized
and “stovepiped” organizational structure, which inhibited the formation of
flexible combined-arms task forces.
Moreover, the lack of experience in defending against a fluid combined-arms
offensive caused the allies to create a
rather brittle, forward-focused defense
instead of the defense in tactical and operational depth that was later found effective against the blitzkrieg. In addition,
the failure of the German advance into
the Soviet Union in 1941 was due not so
much to the oft-cited reduction in panzer
divisions (which House cites as an actual
advantage, in that it created more balanced divisional structures) as to the
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failure of the Wehrmacht to prepare logistics support suited to the resulting
depth of the theater.

campaigns. Although his points are otherwise well made, on this issue he seems
to overreach a bit.

If the book has a fault, it lies in the numerous maps and organizational charts
that accompany the text. Though
House’s prose is clear and straightforward, the maps do not help the layman
really grasp the dynamics of the battles.
Similarly, although House thoughtfully
includes a key to the numerous symbols
that soldiers use to depict units on maps
and tables of organization, he leaves out
a number of the more esoteric ones that
inhabit the book. This is a minor irritant—in general the book is well supported by a glossary of technical terms
and acronyms, liberal annotations, and
an extensive bibliography—but it should
be fixed in the next edition if the book is
to be considered a true introductory text.

In summary, Jonathan House has produced a useful and readable text for anyone who wants a better understanding of
how modern armies fight.

House has a clear thesis that permeates
his analysis: combined-arms structure
(comprising tanks, artillery, infantry, helicopters, engineers, etc.) should be integrated at the lowest practicable level and
balanced to provide the most flexibility
to the commander. (In practice, this
seems to occur only at the division or
sometimes the brigade level.) The commander can then select various types of
units to form combined-arms task forces
that can address the type of operations
planned. House’s discussion of the long
and painful history of armies’ struggles to
achieve this balance and flexibility brings
to mind the equally painful attempts at
jointness among services.
House inevitably addresses the issue of
air support as a piece of the combinedarms puzzle. He analytically describes the
objections airmen have to integrating
airpower into a combined-arms ground
organization, but in his conclusions he
argues against separate, air-only
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McBride, William M. Technological Change and the
United States Navy, 1865–1945. Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2000. 352pp. $45

This is not a technological history of the
U.S. Navy per se but rather an exploration of how the dominant culture of the
Navy’s leadership drove specific technological choices in the transition from the
sailing ship of the line to the battleship and then to the aircraft carrier.
McBride’s thesis centers on two points:
that the organization and culture of the
U.S. Navy have traditionally been defined
by its capital ships; and that new technologies challenging the relevance of the
current capital ship are generally resisted
by senior leaders, who seek both to maintain control over change and to inhibit
any developments that suggest a transfer
of power to individuals with the skills,
functions, and organizational relationships of a new “technological paradigm.”
These themes are familiar to those who
follow the academic literature on technology and culture, but McBride is undoubtedly correct in his contention that
there is no widespread understanding of
the specific impact of the dominant service culture on technology selection. A
thorough appreciation of the full range
of forces that drive technological choices
would appear to be particularly
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